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WITNESSES-COMPETENCY OF SPOUSES TO TESTIFY
AGAINST EACH OTHER IN CRIMINAL TRIAL-
COMPELLING THE SPOUSE TO TESTIFY
Should a wife be compelled, over her objection, to testify
against her husband in his criminal trial for assaulting her with
a dangerous weapon or instrument likely to produce great bodily
h-,rm? This was the question that faced the Supreme Court of
Ohio when it decided the recent case of State v. Antill.1 The
court held that she could be compelled to testify and that the
trial court had not erred in holding her in contempt of court and
incarcerating her in the county jail until she agreed to testify.
To understand the full importance of such a ruling it will be
necessary to explore the development of the area of the law
encompassing the competency of one spouse to testify against the
other, who is the subject of a criminal trial.
The Situation at Common Law
It is a common law rule of great antiquity that neither party
to a marriage can be a witness in favor of or against the other,
in a suit to which the other is a party, or has a direct or imme-
diate interest, save a few exceptional cases where their testimony
is admitted on grounds of necessity.
2
The antiquity of this common law rule is so great as to render
even the century of its origin well nigh undiscoverable. It was
founded upon two reasons: (1) the danger of causing dissension
and of disturbing the peace of families; (2) the natural repug-
nance of fair-minded persons to compelling the husband or wife
to be the means of the other's condemnation. It may therefore
be said that the rule is bottomed upon a humane public policy
intended to protect the sanctity of the home and happiness of
the family.3
Like most other rules, this one was subject to certain excep-
tions, one of which was that a wife could testify against her
husband in a criminal prosecution for an offense against her
person. When this exception was first recognized is almost as
hard to determine as is the origin of the rule itself, but it cer-
tainly existed, or was laid down for the first time, at the time of
Lord Audley's Tria14 in 1631. Lady Audley was held competent
1. 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).
2. 58 Am. JuL- Witnesses § 175 (1958).
3. Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 231 S.W. 41 (1921).
4. 3 How. St. Tr. 401, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140 (C.P. 1631).
1
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to testify against her husband at his prosecution for aiding an-
other to rape her. In ruling that she could testify the court said,
"for she was the party wronged, otherwise she might be abused."
Thus under the common law and statutes declaratory thereof,
the general rule is that in a criminal trial where one spouse is
the defendant the other is not a competent witness either for or
against the defendant.5 This rule was, of course, subject to the
exception already noted that one spouse was competent to testify
against the other when the crime was one against the person of
the testifying spouse.0 Courts operating under the common law,
in the absence of statutes, have tended to follow strictly the rule
and permit the testimony of one spouse only where the offense
was actually one against the person of the testifying spouse. As
can easily be imagined, it is not always a simple matter to deter-
mine whether or not an offense is one against the person of
another.
All cases decided under the common law rule have held that
assault and battery is a crime against the person of the spouse
and that the injured spouse is competent to testify against the
accused spouse.7 It also seems that any attempt by one spouse to
murder the other is a crime against the person, and the offended
spouse is permitted to testify against the accused spouse., A wife
is competent to testify against her husband who has performed
an abortion upon her.9 Decisions under the common law rule
are in conflict as to whether abandonment or failure to support
are crimes against the wife that will render her competent to
5. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) ; Hiller v. People, 156 Ill.
511, 41 N.E. 181 (1895) ; State v. Orth, 79 Ohio St. 130, 86 N.E. 476 (1908);
State v. Woodrow, 58 W.Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905).
6. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839) ; Clark v. State, 117 Ala.
1, 23 So. 671 (1898); Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. L. Rep. 580, 14 S.W.
834 (1890) ; Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351 (1882); Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio
St. 87 (1877); State v. Davis, 3 Brev. 3 (S.C. 1811); Meade v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E.2d 858 (1947).
7. McGee v. State, 4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912); Hardin v. State,
203 Ga. 641, 47 S.E.2d 745 (1948); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 449,
31 S.W.2d 697 (1930) ; Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351 (1882) ; State v. David-
son, 77 N.C. 522 (1877) ; State v. French, 203 N.C. 632, 166 S.E. 747 (1932) ;
State v. Davis, 3 Brev. 3 (S.C. 1811) ; State v. Boyd, 2 Hill 288 (S.C. 1834).
8. Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1926) (poisoned candy
mailed to wife) ; Williams v. State, 149 Ala. 4, 43 So. 720 (1907) (assault with
intent to murder wife) ; Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. L. Rep. 580, 14 S.W.
834 (1890) (attempt to poison wife) ; State v. Alderman, 182 N.C. 917, 110 S.E.
59 (1921) (assault with intent to kill) ; Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87 (1877)
(assault with intent to kill) ; Davis v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 838, 38 S.E. 181
(1910) (poisoned well out of which wife was accustomed to drinking).
9. Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 231 S.W. 41 (1921); Mungor v.
State, 62 N.J.L. 1, 42 At. 577 (1899) (dictum).
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testify against her husband. In some states she is considered
incompetent to testify,1 0 while in others she is considered com-
petent, the courts holding that she is the one upon whom the
injury has been inflicted.1
Under the common law rule it is generally held that such
crimes as adultery,12 bigamy, 13 husband's rape of another wom-
an,14 indecent assault upon the wife's daughter,' 5 or sexual inter-
course with the wife's daughter 16 are not crimes against the
person of the wife rendering her competent to testify against her
husband. Also, one spouse is not competent to testify against the
other who is charged with such crimes as arson, 17 forgery,' 8
vagrancy, 19 kidnapping the wife prior to marriage,2 0 rape of the
wife prior to marriage,2 ' disturbing the peace of the spouse,22
or criminal contempt.
23
Generally if the crime is against a person other than the
spouse,24 or is essentially a crime against the property of the
10. Ulmer v. State, 157 Miss. 807, 128 So. 749 (1930); State v. Orth, 79
Ohio St. 130, 86 N.E. 476 (1908).
11. Carnley v. State, 162 Ala. 94, 50 So. 362 (1909) ; West v. Commonwealth,
194 Ky. 536, 540 S.W. 52 (1922); State v. Bean, 104 Mo.App. 255, 78 S.W.
640 (1904).
12. Cotton v. People, 62 Ala. 12 (1878) ; People v. Green, 276 Ill. 346, 111
N.E. 518 (1916) ; State v. Aswell, 193 N.C. 399, 137 S.E. 174 (1927); Contra,
Mitchell v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 697, 140 Pac. 622 (1914).
13. Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881); Williams v. State, 44 Ala.
24 (1870); Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 260 (1881); Barber v. People, 203 Ill.
543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903).
14. State v. Adams, 193 N.C. 581, 137 S.E. 657 (1927).
15. People v. Westbrook, 94 Mich. 629, 54 N.W. 486 (1893).
16. State v. Deputy, 3 Penn. 19, 50 Atl. 176 (Del. 1900) ; Toth v. State, 141
Neb. 448, 3 N.W.2d 899 (1942).
17. State v. McMullis, 156 Miss. 663, 126 So. 662 (1930).
18. Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935) ; People v. Ernst, 306
Ill. 452, 138 N.E. 116 (1923).
19. Merriweather v. State, 81 Ala. 74, 1 So. 560 (1887).
20. Allen v. State, 60 Ga. App. 248, 3 S.E.2d 780 (1939).
21. Doss v. State, 150 Miss. 522, 126 So. 197 (1930) ; Norman v. State, 127
Tenn. 340, 155 S.W. 135 (1922) ; State v. Winnett, 48 Wash. 93, 92 Pac. 904
(1907). Contra, State v. Woods, 130 Kan. 492, 247 Pac. 284 (1930).
22. State v. Vaughn, 136 Mo. App. 645, 118 S.W. 1186 (1909).
23. Wiecherzak v. Wiercherzak, 115 N.J.Eq. 89, 169 Atl. 632 (1934).
24. Grier v. State, 158 Ga. 321, 123 S.E. 210 (1924) (husband shot and
killed child in his wife's arms, injuring the wife also, but was being tried for
the murder of the child) ; Toth v. State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N.W.2d 899 (1942)
(incest by husband with his daughter) ; State v. Goodwin, 60 Ohio App. 632,
21 N.E.2d 482 (1938) (husband cut and wounded another person); State v.
Woodrow, 68 W.Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905) (husband shot child in wife's
arms also wounding the wife but was being tried for murder of the child).
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spouse, 25 the spouse is held not competent to testify against the
other who is charged with the crime.
Statutory Changes in the Common Law Rule
Though the incompetency of one spouse to testify against the
other was a rule at common law, every state legislature has pro-
vided in statutory form the manner in which the privilege is to
be applied in its state.20 It is well to note here that the common
law rule remains in full force except in those respects where it
has been modified by statute.
2 7
The statutes that have been enacted in the states vary consid-
erably in content, from almost complete abolition of the common
law rule, as in South Carolina where one spouse is both com-
petent and compellable to testify against the other, except with
respect to communications between them,28 to an almost complete
codification of the common law rule, as is the case in Texas
where one spouse is only competent to testify against the other
where there is an offense against the person of the testifying
spouse.20 Between these two outer limits there is much variation
in what the statutes encompass, and any attempt to do more than
broadly summarize them is, at best, difficult.
A minority of the states have statutes that make one spouse
incompetent in most cases to testify against the other.30 How-
ever, these statutes usually provide an exception whereby the
spouse is competent to testify based on the exception to the com-
mon law rule which makes one spouse competent to testify
against the other where the crime is against the person of the
testifying spouse.3 1 Some of these statutes apply the exception
25. Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935) (forging signature on
check) ; State v. McMullins, 156 Miss. 633, 126 So. 662 (1930) (burning hus-
band's house); Meade v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E.2d 858 (1947)
forgery of signature) ; State v. Kephart, 56 Wash. 561, 106 Pac. 165 (1910)
(burning of wife's property).
26. See generally Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 362 (1952) for an excellent dis-
cussion and summary of the statutes.
27. Meade v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E. 858 (1947).
28. S. C. CODE ANN. §26-403 (1962).
29. TEx. CODE CnM. PROc. ANN. art. 714 (1954).
30. E.g., Anx. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2019, 43-2020 (1947); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1410, 38-1604 (1935) ; IOWA CODE § 622-7 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1689
(1942) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-1220, 42-1221 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. AN.N.
§8-57 (1953); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2945-42 (Page 1954); OYLA. STAT.
tit. 22 § 702 (1961) ; TEX. CODE CRaI. PRoc. ANN. art. 714 (1954).
31. IOWA CODE § 622-7 (1962) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 702 (1961) ; TEx. CODE
CRM. Paoc. ANN. art. 714 (1954).
4
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specifically to bigamy and criminal cohabitation, 32 failure to
support children or neglect of or cruelty to children,3 3 or crimes
against the property of the other spouse.3 4
Most of the states have statutes which provide that husbands
and wives are competent witnesses against one another in all
criminal cases and may testify as to any occurrences except
confidential communications between them. 3, Under some of
these statutes both spouses must consent before one can testify 6
or the defendant spouse can prevent the other from testifying
against him3 7 or the witness spouse may refuse to testify.
38
These statutes have generally broadened the exception to the
common law rule and some specifically make one spouse com-
petent to testify against the other who is accused of such crimes
as bigamy,3 9 adultery,40 rape,41 crimes against nature,42 crimes
against the children,43 and abandonment.4 4
Generally under the statutes which make spouses competent to
testify against each other for a crime committed against the
other, without specifying the crimes included in this class, the
tendency of the courts has been to make the spouse competent
in cases where the crime is against her or him in any way and
not just against the person, as was the common law rule. Under
these statutes such crimes as murder and attempted murder of
spouse or her child,45 abandonment,46 aiding another to rape
32. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-57 (1953).
33. Ibid.
34. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-2018, 43-2020 (1947).
35. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 311 (1958); Ariz. CODE ANN. § 44-2702
(1939) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1322 (1956) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 153-1-7 (1953) ;
CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. 54-82 (1958) ; Kz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-210 (1963) ;
LA. REv. STAT. § 15-461 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 35 §4
(1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233 § 20, ch. 273 § 7 (1956); MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.916 (Supp. 1949); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4081 (1939); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-288 (Supp. 1964).
36. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1322 (1956).
37. E.g., ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-2702 (1939) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 153-1-7
(1953).
38. E.g., CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 54-82 (1958).
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1322 (1956).
40. Ibid.
41. Auz. CODE ANN. § 44-2702 (1939).
42. Ibid.
43. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1322 (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-288 (Supp. 1964).
44. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 311 (1958) ; ARiz. CCDE ANN. § 44-2702 (1939).
45. O'Laughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932) ; Miller v. State,
78 Neb. 645, 111 N.W. 63 (1907).
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his wife,47 abortion,48 certain cases of perjury4 9 and making
serious threats to take the life of the spouse5" are generally held
to be within the statute. Such crimes as adultery,5 ' rape of an-
other woman 5 2 incest by the husband with his wife's daughter,5 3
burning the wife's property,54 forgery of the other spouse's
name,5 5 slander against the spouse,55 or theft of the spouse's
property 57 have been held not to be a crime by one spouse against
the other, under these statutes.
The Situation in South Carolina
South Carolina originally followed the common law rule, as
did the other states, holding that one spouse was not competent
to testify against the other who was party to a criminal proceed-
ing. The Supreme Court of South Carolina first recognized the
exception to this rule in 1811 when State v. Davis58 was decided.
In that case the husband was charged with assaulting and beat-
ing his wife. The court, in ruling that the wife was competent
to testify against her husband stated their opinion of the purpose
of the rule as follows:
The rule of evidence which excludes the testimony of a wife
against her husband is founded in policy to support the
matrimonial union, and maintain the peace of families,
rather than in principles of public justice. A superior policy
may require an exception to the rule, in order to prevent the
perpetration of enormous crimes, which might otherwise
pass unpunished. But there is no case to favor this distinc-
tion. The case of The King v. Aziz, 1 Str. 633, is a case in
47. Kitchen v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 439, 276 S.W. 542 (1925).
48. Navarro v. State, 24 Tex. App. 378, 6 S.W. 542 (1887).
49. Dill v. People, 19 Colo. 469, 36 Pac. 229 (1894).
50. Murray v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 141, 86 S.W. 1024 (1905).
51. Hall v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 459, 188 S.W.2d 388 (1945).
52. Cargill v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 314, 220 Pac. 64 (1923) (husband raped
wife's child) ; State v. Goff, 64 S.D. 80, 264 N.W. 665 (1936). Contra, Wilkin-
son v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929) (husband raped the wife's
daughter and the wife could testify against him).
53. Torth v. State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N.W.2d 899 (1942); Vickers v. State,
69 Tex. Crim. 628, 154 S.W. 578 (1912). Contra, State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa
1, 53 N.W. 1090 (1893).
54. State v. Kephart, 56 Wash. 561, 106 Pac. 165 (1910).
55. Molyneux v. Wilcockson, 157 Iowa 39, 137 N.V. 1016 (1912); Meade v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E.2d 858 (1947).
56. Baxter v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 516, 31 S.W. 394 (1895).
57. Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616 (1873).
58. 3 Brev. 3 (S.C. 1811).
[Vol. 16
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point to show that a wife is a good witness to convict her
husband of assaulting and beating her. It is clear that the
wife may demand sureties of the peace against her husband;
and so may her husband against her.5 9
The statement of this court that, "[a] superior policy may re-
quire an exception to the rule, in order to prevent the perpetra-
tion of enormous crimes, that might otherwise go unpunished,"
was an early sounding of the attitude that has prevailed in
South Carolina, thereby maling South Carolina one of the most
liberal states in the union in this area.
In State 'v. Boyd6 ° decided in 1834, the court again held that
the wife was a competent witness against her husband who was
charged with beating and assaulting her. The court there stated,
"since Lord Audley's Case it seems to have been held that the
wife may be a competent witness against her husband on a prose-
cution for a personal outrage committed against her.",,1
It was early settled in South Carolina that the wife was not
per se incompetent to testify in criminal proceedings in which
her husband was not competent to testify, thereby terminating
the old theory that the interest of the husband and wife were in-
separable and what made one an incompetent witness necessarily
made the other incompetent. So in 1821, when a father and son
were jointly indicted for murder but were tried separately, the
son's wife was held to be a competent witness for the father
though obviously the son would not have been competent to
testify. In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned as follows:
But it is laying down the proposition too broad to say that
the wife can in no case be a witness where the husband is
incompetent. A conviction of perjury or felony will render
the husband incompetent; but that would not affect the com-
petency of the wife. I can perceive no such interest in this
case as should exclude the testimony of the wife.6"
This again exhibits the liberal view that was present in South
Carolina courts from early times.
The rule thus laid down that the wife may be competent to
testify even though her husband would not be, was expanded in
59. State v. Davis, 3 Brev. 3 (S.C. 1811).
60. 2 Hill 288 (S.C. 1834).
61. Id. at 289.
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State 'v. Drawdy 3 to permit the wife of one indicted for bur-
glary, but not on trial, to testify for the state against the two
defendants who were indicted together with her husband. In
State v. Workman,0 4 decided in 1881, the limits of this rule were
probably defined. In that case the wife of one of two defendants
being tried together for arson was held not competent to testify
for her husband or for the co-defendant. The court, however,
stated that she could have been used to prove a distinct and
independent defense for the co-defendant. The court reaffirmed
this holding two years later in State v. Dodson. 5
In 1866 South Carolina enacted a statute which made the hus-
band and wife competent and compellable to testify for or
against each other in civil cases. To insure that the statute was
applied only to civil cases, the legislature included a provision
stating, "nothing herein contained shall render any husband or
wife competent or compellable to give evidence for or against
the other in any criminal action or proceeding .... )66
The court ruled that this was manifestly for the purpose of
excluding the possibility that this statute might be construed as
applying to criminal cases.67 As this statute appeared in the
South Carolina Code of 189308 the last quoted provision was
omitted, the code providing that one spouse was competent but
not compellable to testify- for or against the other in any pro-
ceeding. In State v. Reynolds0 the court interpreted this as
meaning that the wife of the defendant, who was prosecuted for
incest with his daughter, was a competent witness against him.
The above provisions of the 1866 statute appear to have been
omitted entirely from the codes of 190270 and 1912.71 In fact, in
both of these codes there was a note following a provision that
a husband or wife shall not be required to disclose confidential
communications, which stated that the rule that a wife is incom-
petent as a witness for or against her husband was not changed.
Therefore in State v. Bramlett,72 decided in 1920, the court did
63. State v. Drawdy, 14 Rich. 87 (S.C. 1866).
64. 15 S.C. 540 (1881).
65. 16 S.C. 453 (1882).
66. S.C. CODE OF PROC. cb. VII, § 415 (1880).
67. State v. BeIcher, 13 S.C. 459 (1880).
68. S.C. CODE §400 (1893).
69. 48 S.C. 384, 26 S.E. 679 (1897).
70. S.C. CrIM. CODE § 64 (1902).
71. CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. ch. VI, § 87 (1912).
72. 114 S.C. 389, 103 S.E. 755 (1920).
[Vol. 16
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not make reference to a statute in ruling that records of alimony
proceedings between a wife and husband, the husband then on
trial for murder of his wife's mother, were not admissible as
evidence. This was decided on the constitutional ground that
an accused has a right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.73 The court could have stopped there but continued,
"in addition to this, the statements in the record were introduced
as the statements of Mrs. Bramlett who was the wife of the
defendant. The 'wivfe is not a competent witness against her
husband.'7 4 (emphasis added.)
Despite these inconsistencies in the South Carolina position,
apparently brought about by legislation, the whole situation has
been clearly settled in South Carolina for over 40 years. The
South Carolina Code of 192275 stated in no uncertain terms that
the husband or wife of any party is competent and compellable
to give evidence just as any other witness, except that they shall
not be required to disclose any confidential communication, or
in a criminal proceeding, any communications made by one to
the other during their marriage. This is still the law in South
Carolina."0
The Situation in The Federal Courts
There is very little federal legislation on the competency of
one spouse to testify for or against the other in criminal pro-
ceedings. In 1892 the Supreme Court ruled that the provisions
of the statute 7 which declared that the competency of a witness
to testify in a civil action in United States courts should be
determined by the laws of the state or territory in which the
court was held did not apply to criminal trials. The Court held
that the competency of a witness to testify in a criminal trial in
the federal courts was governed by the common law.78
A statute was enacted in 1887 which made it permissible for a
spouse to testify in cases where the other spouse was prosecuted
in federal courts for bigamy, polygamy or unlawful cohabita-
tion.79 The witness under this statute could not be compelled to
73. S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 18 (1895).
74. State v. Bramlett, 114 S.C. 389, 103 S.E. 755 (1920).
75. S.C. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 708, CR. PROC. § 98 (1922).
76. S.C. CODE AN. §26-403 (1962).
77. 12 Stat. 588 (1862).
78. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
79. 24 Stat. 635 (1887); See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881),
where a Mormon's second living wife was held not competent to testify against
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testify, nor could he testify as to confidential communications.
Husband and wife have also been made competent by statute to
testify against each other in prosecutions for importing aliens
for immoral purposes.8 0 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure now provides that the federal courts shall deter-
mine the admissibility of evidence and competency and privileges
of witnesses under the principles of common law as they may
be interpreted in the light of reason and experience.8 1
With the exception of areas in which statutes are provided,
as already noted, the federal courts have consistently relied on
the common law rule that one spouse is not competent to testify
against the other in criminal proceedings. In Stein v. Bowman,
8 2
decided in 1839, the Supreme Court held that a wife was not a
competent witness against her husband to prove he committed
perjury. In speaking of the wife's incompetency the court said:
It is, however, admitted in all the cases that the wife is not
competent, except in cases of violence upon her person di-
rectly to criminate her husband; or to disclose that which
she has learned from him in their confidential intercourse.
.. .This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest
principle of our nature. Principles which have grown out
of those domestic relations which constitute the basis of
civil society, and which are essential to the enjoyment of
the confidence which should subsist between those who are
connected by the nearest and dearest relations of life [sie].
To break down or impair the great principles which protect
the sanctities of husband and wife, would be to destroy the
best solace of human existence.
8 3
In this statement the Supreme Court set the tone for the strict-
ness with which they would apply this rule in future cases, even
it was proved, she was prima facie his wife and incompetent to testify. The
Supreme Court decided she could not be used to show the first marriage and
her competency at the same time.
80. 39 Stat. 878 (1917) ; 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1958).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958). Rule 26 provides, "... The admissibility of
evidence and the competency of witnesses shall be governed, except when an
act of congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." See United States v. Graham, 87 F.Supp. 373
(E.D. Mich. 1949) where the court discussed Rule 26 in determining that a
wife was competent to testify against her husband who was accused of inter-
state transportation of money he fraudulently took from her.
82. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209; Also see Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496
(1890), where the Supreme Court held that the rule laid down in Stein v.
Bowman was applicable to criminal prosecutions.
83. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 222, 223 (1839).
[Vol. 16
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to the present time, making exceptions only where there was a
crime committed that could be classified as a crime against the
person of the spouse.
The Court in 1893 restated this rule in Graves v. United
States"4 and held that the wife of a defendant on trial for mur-
der was neither a competent witness in behalf of or against her
husband. Forty years later the Court changed to some extent the
position it had taken in the Craves case and held in Funk v.
United States 5 that the wife of a defendant accused of violating
the prohibition law was a competent witness for her husband.
In so ruling the Court said:
The exclusion of the husband or wife is said by this court
to be based upon his or her interest in the event. And wheth-
er by that is meant a practical interest in the result of the
prosecution or merely a sentimental interest because of the
marital relationship makes little difference. In either case
a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest to
testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who
has the greater interest, to testify for himself, presents a
manifest incongruity.
Nor can the exclusion of the wife's testimony, in the face
of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect
of the competency of a witness generally, be any longer
justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public
policy. . . . The public policy of one generation may not,
under changed conditions be the public policy of another.8"
In the light of this reasoning the Supreme Court laid down the
rule that one spouse is competent to testify for the other who is
prosecuted for a crime. But the Court did not go so far as to
abolish the common law rule that one spouse is not competent
to testify against the other, with some few exceptions.
The federal courts have limited the competency of one spouse
to testify against the other to cases where the prosecution was
for a crime committed against the person of the testifying spouse.
This exception applies, and the wife is permitted to testify where
the husband is charged with assault and battery against his
wife.s 7 Mailing a box of poison candy to one's wife is also an act
84. 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
85. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
86. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380 (1933).
87. United States v. Smallwood, 27 Fed. Cas. 1131 (No. 16316) (C.C.D.C.
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of personal violence against her, making her competent to testify
on her husband's prosecution for such an act.
88
Such crimes as forging a husband's name to a check, 9 improp-
erly opening and removing the contents of a registered letter, 0
or interstate transportation of money fraudulently taken from
the wife0' are not crimes against the person of the spouse that
will make him or her competent to testify against the defendant
spouse.
In 1958 the Supreme Court again affirmed its intention to
follow the common law rule and apply it strictly. In Hawkins ,v.
United States 2 the Court held a wife incompetent to testify
against her husband who was accused of transporting a female,
not his wife, across a state line for immoral purposes. The Court
reasoned:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against
husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or
liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was neces-
sary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of the
husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public
as well. Such a belief has never been unreasonable and is
not now.98
The Court did not completely close the door on future changes
in the rule stating, "as we have already indicated, however, this
decision does not foreclose whatever changes in the rule may
eventually be dictated by reason and experience." 49
This seems to be the state of the general law on this subject
in the federal courts, except for the line of cases dealing with
the husband's interstate transportation for immoral purposes
of his wife, or a woman whom he later marries.
Most of the federal cases involving the competency of one
spouse to testify against the other arise under the Mani Act
passed in 1910.05 In these cases, it often turns out that the woman
transported for immoral purposes was the wife of the accused
or became his wife after the crime had been committed. Early
88. Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1926).
89. Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935).
90. Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948).
91. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949).
92. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
93. Id. at 77.
94. Id. at 74.
95. 18 U.S.C. §2421 (1958).
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decisions of some federal courts declared that the wife in such
cases was not competent to testify against her husband since no
personal violence against the wife was shown.9 6 But this rule
was not followed by all federal courts. In Cohen v. United
States97 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
wife was a competent witness against her husband under the
exception to the rule that would permit her to testify in a case
of personal wrong or injury against her. The court stated-
We are of the opinion that the personal injury to a wife
which permits the admission of her testimony against her
husband, within the recognized exception recognized at the
common law . . . is not confined to cases of personal vio-
lence but may include cases involving a tort against the
wife, or a serious moral wrong inflicted upon her, and that
in a case of prosecution of a man for bringing his wife from
one state to another with intent that she shall practice pros-
titution, in violation of the White Slave Act, his act in so
doing is such a personal injury to her as to entitle her to
testify against him.
98
This rule was eventually adopted and followed by five courts
of appeal.99
The Tenth Circuit decided in 1935 that the rule prohibiting one
spouse from testifying against the other was out-dated and
should be discarded. They permitted the testimony of a wife
against her husband who was accused of interstate transporta-
tion of another woman for immoral purposes.100 This rule was
not accepted by any other federal courts and was finally rejected
by the Supreme Court in 1958.101
In Wyatt v. United tates,102 decided in 1960, the Supreme
Court adopted the rule laid down by the five circuit courts of
appeal that a wife who has been transported interstate for im-
moral purposes is competent to testify against her husband on
his prosecution for such crime. The Court recognized this as an
96. Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915).
97. 214 Fed. 23 (9th Cir. 1914).
98. Cohen v. United States, 174 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914).
99. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Hays v. United
States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Levine v. United States, 163 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943);
Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed. 665 (9th Cir. 1917).
100. Youder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
101. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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offense against the spouse. The Court did not stop here but took
the final step in declaring that not only is the prostituted wife
competent to testify but that she may be compelled to testify.
In reaching this conclusion the Court said:
A primary purpose of the Mann Act was to protect women
who are weak from men who were bad. Applying the legis-
lative judgment underlying the act, we are led to hold it is
not an allowable choice for a prostituted witness wife vol-
untarily to decide to protect her husband by declining to
testify against him. For if a defendant can induce a woman
against her will to enter a life of prostitution for his bene-
fit-and the act rests on the view that he can-by the same
token it should be considered that he can at least as easily
persuade one who has already fallen victim to his influence
that she must protect him. 0 3
In taking this historic step the Court made it clear that this rule
was intended to be confined to Mann Act prosecutions by stating:
"Again, we deal here only with a Mann Act prosecution, and
intimate no view on the applicability of the privilege of either
party or a witness similarly circumstanced in other situations."'
0 4
This is the situation in the federal courts at the present time.
Compelling the Spouse to Testify
Some of the state statutes provide that where one spouse is
made competent to testify against the other, the witness spouse
may be compelled to testify, 0 5 while some of the statutes spe-
cifically provide that the witness spouse shall not be compelled
to testify. 0 0 Obviously, the courts operating under these statutes
have no trouble determining whether the witness spouse can be
compelled to testify. But under common law or where the statute
is silent on the subject of compelling the competent witness
spouse to testify, the courts have to determine whether the fact
that the witness spouse has been made competent to testify also
makes him or her compellable, as are other competent witnesses.
The decisions are not in agreement as to whether a spouse who
is competent to testify against the other, either by statute or
103. Id. at 530.
104. Id. at 531.
105. E.g., CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 54-82 (1958). S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-403
(1962).
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under the common law exception to the rule, can be compelled
to testify.
Perhaps the earliest American case in which the court stated
that the spouse who was made competent by statute to testify
against the other could be compelled to do so, though the statute
was silent on that point, was State v. Black 0 7 decided by the
Supreme Court of Maine in 1874. The reported decision is not
clear as to whether the wife was compelled to testify against her
husband, who was prosecuted for rape of his minor daughter, or
whether she voluntarily testified. The court said she could be
compelled to testify stating, "but the state should have all pos-
sible constitutional means to ferret out and punish crime. u°7a
The Supreme Court of Mississippi faced this problem squarely
in 1882 when deciding State v. Turner108 which is probably the
leading case in this area. In that case the husband was charged
with assault and battery against his wife. Under the exception
to the common law rule she was definitely competent to testify
against him. She objected to testifying but was compelled to do
so by the trial court. In affirming this decision the court rea-
soned as follows:
The exception was permitted for the protection of the wife,
but it was a protection afforded to her not purely as an
individual but as one of the public. Punishment is not in-
flicted upon a wrongdoer to deter him or others from again
wronging the particular individual injured, but to deter
him and others from again injuring any person whatever.
.. . It is the offense against the public for which he is tried.
He is offender of the public, and not the wife alone, and
she is competent to testify as a witness for the public, and
not as a witness for herself. And it is a competency not to
be waived by her, or affected by her desires or fears. 10 9
In State v. Bramett,110 Texas followed the Mississippi lead
and held that a wife could be compelled to testify against her
husband who was on trial for attempting to murder her. She
was competent to testify under the exception to the common law
rule. The court said this was also an injury to the public and
she could be compelled to testify.
107. 603 Me. 210 (1874).
107a. Id. at 212.
108. 60 Miss. 351 (1882).
109. State v. Turner, 60 Miss. 351, 354 (1882).
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In 1892 the Alabama Supreme Court held that a wife who was
competent to testify, under the exception to the common law
rule, against her husband who was accused of assault and battery
against her, could be compelled to testify, "to protect the interest
of the public.""' This was reaffirmed in McGee v. State112 de-
cided in 1912. However, this was apparently not to the liking of
the Alabama legislature, and they have enacted a statute which
makes one spouse competent but not compellable to testify against
the other in criminal proceedings." 3
In 1909 the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida stat-
ute which provided that neither husband nor wife should be
excluded as a witness where either has an interest in the case
meant also that they could not be excluded by their own objec-
tion." 4 The wife made competent thereby to testify against her
husband on his trial for murder, could be compelled to testify
and it was held the trial court had not erred in incarcerating her
in jail for refusing to obey the instructions of the court to testify.
California courts have held that where one spouse is made
competent to testify by statute or the exception to the common
law rule he or she can be compelled to testify. So when a wife
was prosecuted for shooting and wounding her husband it was
held that he could be compelled to testify against her.1 5
The United States Supreme Court, as already noted, decided
in Wyatt v. United States" 6 that a wife could be compelled to
testify against her husband who was accused of transporting
her interstate for immoral purposes. The Court first decided
that under the exception to the common law rule she was com-
petent in such a case to testify against him, as this was consid-
ered a crime against her. The Court then decided that she could
be compelled to testify as could any other competent witness.
The Court's reasoning was that if a man could so dominate his
wife as to make her a prostitute he could convince her that she
should not testify against him. The Court was careful to note
that, for the present at least, this ruling was to be confined to
these violations of the Mann Act. However, it would seem that
since this step has been taken, the Court might logically hold
that wherever one spouse is a competent witness against the
111. Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 50, 10 So. 427 (1892).
112. 4 Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1008 (1912).
113. ALA. CODS ANN. tit. 15 § 311 (1958).
114. Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909).
115. Young v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 331, 190 Cal. App.2d 759 (1961).
116. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
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other, in federal cases, he or she can be compelled to testify. The
Court may find it difficult to keep such a rule confined solely
to the facts as presented in the Wyatt case.
Not all courts which have faced the problem have held that
the competent spouse witness can be compelled to testify. The
Kentucky Supreme Court in Hall v. Commonwealth11 indicated
by way of dictum that a competent spouse witness in that state
could not be compelled to testify against the defendant spouse.
The court reaffirmed this in 1953 when it decided Coffey v.
Commonealth.118 The Supreme Court of Missouri held in 1950
that a wife could not be compelled to testify against her husband
because the statute provided only that one spouse was "per-
mitted" to testify against the other.119 In State v. LaFili'120 the
Oregon Supreme Court held that the wife of a defendant ac-
cused of attempted criminal assault of his minor daughter, could
not be compelled to testify against her husband. The court de-
cided that the state statute only permitted one spouse to testify
against the other if he so chose.
Concluions
This was the state of the law when the Ohio Supreme Court
sat to decide State v. Antill. The Ohio statute provided that hus-
band and wife are authorized to testify against each other in a
prosecution for personal injury of either by the other, but the
statute was silent on the issue of compelling one spouse to testify
against the other.
Antill had been indicted for striking and stabbing his wife
with a butcher knife. At his criminal prosecution, his wife re-
fused to testify against him, and as a result she was held in con-
tempt of court and incarcerated in jail until she agreed to testify.
The court was thus squarely faced with the question of wheth-
er or not the court could, under the statute, which is essentially
an enactment of the common law rule, compel the wife to testify
against her husband. The court decided that she could be com-
pelled to testify, following the reasoning of most other courts
which have so decided, that the crime is not against the injured
spouse alone but also against the public and the injured spouse
117. 309 Ky. 74, 215 S.W.2d 840 (1948).
118. 256 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1953).
119. State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 230 S.W.2d 845 (1950).
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is competent to testify on behalf of the public and, therefore, can
be compelled to testify for the public.
In reaching this conclusion, the court only did what other
progressive courts have done and what has been done by many
state legislatures. It seems to be sound reasoning that when a
crime is committed by any person against another it is also a
crime against society and society has the right to demand that
the wrongdoer be punished. In this sense the injured party, even
if the spouse of the accused, should have the duty, as would any
other citizen, to testify against the wrong-doer.
In most people, there is probably at first blush an inherent
repugnance to the thought of one spouse's being the instrument
of the state in the conviction and punishment of the other spouse.
Indeed, this argument fortified by the idea that it is in the
interest of society to preserve and protect marriages, is used by
some courts which hold that one spouse cannot be compelled to
testify against the other.
As a practical matter, however, when one spouse has committed
a crime against the other so serious as to be prosecuted by the
state for it, there is probably, in most instances, not much of a
marriage left to protect. If on the other hand the marriage is
strong enough to survive the incidents which brought the parties
into the courtroom in the first place, it would not seem that the
fact that one spouse is forced by law to testify against the de-
fendant spouse would weaken the survival chances of the mar-
riage, as might be true if the injured spouse voluntarily testified
against the defendant spouse.
Further considerations are that one spouse may refuse to tes-
tify, if given a choice, out of fear of the defendant spouse, or,
as some Mann Act cases suggest, because the defendant husband
has such strong influence over his wife that he can convince her
that she should protect him. The probability of attempted re-
venge against the witness spouse by the defendant spouse would
seem to be no greater than the probability of attempted revenge
by a defendant against any other witness. If the defendant
spouse has such influence over the witness spouse as to convince
her that she should protect him, then the public benefits from
that spouse's being compelled to testify.
These considerations coupled with the assumption that a crime
by one person against another is a crime against the community
and that one is not punished to deter him from committing a
crime against the same person but to deter his commission of
[Vol. 16
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crimes against other members of society, point to the soundness
of the conclusion reached by the Ohio Supreme Court. As a prac-
tical matter, there is really much less reason for not permitting
or compelling one spouse to testify against the other than many
courts and some state legislatures have believed in the past. It is
safe to assume that most jurisdictions, at some future time, will
follow the conclusion of the Ohio Supreme Court and others
which have decided similarly in the past.
All jurisdictions continue to recognize the sanctity of confi-
dential communications made between husband and wife during
marriage, and they are not competent or compellable to disclose
these. This rule is sound for many reasons, among which is the
probability that the free flow of communications between hus-
band and wife may prevent the occurrence of many of the inci-
dents which would bring them into court, one as a defendant and
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STANDARD-REMEDY
One of the first critical reactions to Baker v. Carr,' which
held the Tennessee voting apportionment unconstitutional, was
the absence of a remedy to be afforded to this and like cases.
Before a remedy can be fashioned, however, there must be an
apportionment standard. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the standard thus far evolved as a basis for a remedy.
The Apportionment Standard
The Baker case in essence determined only three things: first,
that the Court had jurisdiction; second, that state legislative
apportionment is a justiciable issue in a federal forum; and third,
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
guaranteed the inalienable right to full and effective participa-
tion by a citizen in the political processes of the state legislature.
The only discussion of standards came from the concurring and
dissenting opinions. From Baker therefore came only the articu-
lated general guide that the fourteenth amendment prohibited
"invidious discrimination.12 The phrase is more a vituperation
than a standard.
Professor Dixon of George Washington University Law
School, writing shortly after the Baker decision, foresaw two
directions the Court could take. First, the Court could create a
basic rule, as a matter of constitutional law, that the Constitu-
tion requires numerical equality in representation, unless intrin-
sically reasonable and consistently used grounds for deviation
can be shown. Second, the Court could create a constitutional
rule that apportionment must be done under some intelligible
and consistently used formula, without pre-judging at all the
question of the role that population or other factors should play
in the formula.3
Predicted by Wesberry v. Sanders,4 Reyno7ds v. Sims5 and its
companion cases,0 which held that population is the controlling
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 436 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Wesbury
v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 282 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
3. Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW
& CO TEMP. PRoD. 329, 369 (1962).
4. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
5. 84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
6. Davis v. Mann, 84 Sup. Ct. 1453 (1964) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
Assembly of the State of Colorado, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472 (1964) ; Maryland Comm.
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 84 Sup. Ct. 1442 (1964) ; Roman v. Sincock,
84 Sup. Ct. 1462 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418 (1964).
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criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies,
follow Professor Dixon's first rule. The representative theory
of the decision is therefore conflicting-equality through majori-
tarianism and minority representation through districting. Rey-
nolds, however, only proscribes a first line of unconstitutionality.
It does not consider the situation in which districts are sub-
stantially equal by population yet gerrymandered by voting
interest.
Reynolds, for our purposes of prescribing a remedy, is theo-
retically only a starting point. If our remedy merely entailed
shifting representatives from unequal districts there would be
no problem; if our remedy goes toward redrawing district lines
then population is an oversimpliciation, ignoring regional needs
and interests which was the rationale of districting. Recognition
of other factors in the apportionment formula therefore becomes
necessary, if not in the gerrymandering situation then de facto
in providing a judicial remedy when districts are reshaped.
The one gerrymandering case decided by the Court, Gomilliom
v. Lightfoot,7 offers no help toward a solution. In that situation
the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, was reshaped by the state legis-
lature from a square geographical district to a twenty-eight-
sided figure, coincidentally excluding most of the Negro voters.
Holding the act unconstitutional and void was striking toward
the underlying racial discrimination, a factor well recognized
in analogous cases. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion in
Gomillion, was careful to distinguish that case from Colegrove v.
Green,8 which had held that apportionment was not justiciable,
on the basis that first, Gomillion was decided under the fifteenth
amendment, and second, the alleged discrimination in Colegrove
resulted from the legislature's failure to act while Gomilliorm
involved affirmative legislative action. The Court's remedy was
also uncomplicated in that the city was put back in its former
status by negation of the Redistricting Act.
The merit of the Reynolds' standard, however, is that the
Court has not limited itself in defining the outer limits of the
apportionment formula and may yet accept the more subtle vot-
ing discrimination cases such as gerrymandering, thus further
expanding its formula. The greater question is whether the
formula is sufficiently defined to allow the lower courts to offer
a proper remedy.
7. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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Undefined Remedy Under the Equality Standard
The majority opinion of Baker makes no mention of relief.
But as the Court pointed out, justiciability depends partially
on the existence of an equitable remedy for the alleged depriva-
tion. Therefore by holding that Baker presented a justiciable
question, they also tacitly found that the federal courts are able
to grant relief. Justice Douglas commented simply that "any
relief accorded can be fashioned in the light of well known prin-
ciples of equity."19 Such relief, however, contrary to Justice
Douglas's assurance, is not a relief accorded in the light of well
known principles of equity, not so far as judicial precedent is
concerned. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Baker admonished:
A hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions is now
for the first time made the basis for affording illusory relief
for a particular evil even though it foreshadows deeper and
more pervasive difficulties in consequence. The claim is
hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract because the
Court does not vouchsafe the lower courts-state and fed-
eral-guidelines for formulating specific, definite, wholly
unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations that
today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in con-
nection with politically motivated reapportionments in so
many states. In such a setting, to promulgate jurisdiction in
the abstract is meaningless. It is as devoid as "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky," for it conveys no intimation what
relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording that
would not invite legislators to play ducks and drakes with
the judiciary. 10
Justice Clark, on the subject of remedies, was more specific
'vhen he said:
One plan might be to start with the existing assembly dis-
tricts, consolidate some of them, and award the seats thus
released to those counties suffering the most egregious dis-
crimination. Other possibilities are present and might be
more effective. But the plan here suggested would at least
release the strangle hold on the Assembly and permit it to
redistrict itself.'1
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 (1962).
10. Id. at 267, 268.
11. Id. at 260.
[Vol. 16
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Ultimately political issue questions should turn on the stand-
ard-remedy problem 12 implicit in Justice Frankfurter's remarks.
But since the Court in Reynolds has made a choice "among com-
peting theories of political philosophies [to] determine the theo-
retic base of representation,"1 3 Justice Clark's simple solution
becomes pragmatic.
The Court has reviewed only one case in which the lower court
had actively participated in the apportionment plan. In Sims v.
Frink,'1 4 from which Reynolds was appealed, the three judge
court assumed the function of directing an apportionment plan
accepting such parts of proposed state legislative plans as they
thought had merit. The Supreme Court affirmed in Reynolds,
noting with approval that the lower court had appropriately
given the state legislature notice to reapportion before taking
such action.
Application of the Standard
The center of the "political thicket" is the lower court's fash-
ioning the remedy. A number of courts after a finding of uncon-
stitutionality are more prone to allow legislatures more time
to arrive at a solution without judicial interference. Such re-
straint is admirable so long as it is productive-that is if the
legislature takes such action. That, however, has more often been
the exception.' 5
A more direct form of coercion is injunction against holding
elections. The remedy is still left with the legislature but is sub-
ject to more judicial scrutiny. The solution is more prone to what
Justice Frankfurter referred to as "inviting the legislators to
play ducks and drakes with the judiciary." 6 The district court's
refusal to enjoin a primary election was approved by the Su-
preme Court in Reynolds."
Another unsatisfactory solution is election at large. As it com-
pletely ignores minority representation,' it is possibly uncon-
stitutional under Reynolds.'9
12. Dixon, supra note 3, at 356.
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300-01 (1962).
14. 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
15. See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); State cx reL
Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 Wis.2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964).
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962).
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
18. See Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499, 517 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (dissenting
opinion).
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Sims v. Frink,20 in the eyes of the Court, offered an adequate
temporary apportionment. Sims because it was such a patchwork
plan really had little to condemn it on the novelty of judicial
recognition of factors other than population. It has, sub silentio,
partially accepted the previous judgment, historical and legis-
lative. A similar provisional remedy was provided by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in State ece rel. Reynolds v. ZimmermanP'
but out of more whole cloth. Having previously held the existing
apportionment unconstitutional, 22 and the legislature having
failed to act effectively since that time, the court re-drew as-
sembly districts within county lines. Both houses of the legisla-
ture were postulated on population by the state constitution,
allegedly relied on by the court as the standard. The court con-
cluded that since a similar remedy was available in federal court
under the equal protection clause the Wisconsin Supreme Court
should more appropriately provide the remedy.2 3 The court in
Zimmerman accepted county lines as inviolate as required by
the state constitution, reforming assembly districts within them.
Both houses of the Wisconsin legislature were apportioned to
the assembly districts. Aside from these general statements the
court gave no other reasoning for so drawing districts as they
did.
The Zimmerman and Frine cases offer the only logical con-
clusion to the standard thus evolved. The Frink solution has
received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. Framed only
as a provisional remedy the solution is direct and effective, yet
purposely deferred to the legislature for an alternative plan.
In such a manner by taking judicial notice of historical patterns
of districting coupled with contemporary population patterns,
the courts are not overburdened in at least releasing the strangle-
hold on the assembly and permitting it to redistrict itself.
GoRDoN H. GAnu
20. 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
21. 23 Wis.2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964).
22. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis.2d 554, 126 N.W.2d 551
(1964).
23. The resulting logic of Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962) (remand of








The recent case of Jaoobellis v. Ohio, 84 Sup. Ct. 1676 (1964),
takes the developing law of constitutionally protected obscene
expression' a step further by holding that "community stand-
ards" under the test applied in Roth v. United States 2 means
"national" standards as determined by the Court.
In Roth it was held that obscenity is not within the consti-
tutionally protected areas of freedom of speech and press as
guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Roth test as laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan speaking for five
members of the Court is as follows:
. . .whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
The language of the test is essentially that of the proposed
draft of the Model Penal Code.4 The Court in Roth rejected the
traditional "isolated excerpt" and "particularly susceptible per-
son" tests of Regina v. Hieklin.r
Three lines of thought were discernible in Roth. The majority
through Mr. Justice Brennan would support a finding of ob-
scenity by the trier of fact if made in the light of proper stand-
ards. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, inter aria, would require a
de novo factual appraisal by the Court for the reason that the
high body may consider policy questions in its decision. In sharp
contrast to the procedural differences expressed by Mr. Justice
Harlan is the dissent of Justices Black and Douglas. They would
take the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press
as more nearly absolute standards to be limited only by a clear
and present danger test.6
1. See generally Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960).
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. Id. at 489.
4. MODEL PENAL CODE 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1961):
"Material is obscene if, taken as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest . . . and if in addition it goes substantially beyond the customary
limits of candor in describing or representing such matters."
5. L.R.3 Q.B. (1868) : "Whether the tendency of the matter charged is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
6. This analysis is more fully explored in Slough and McAnany, Obscenity
and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 279, 349-57 (1964).
25
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A line of decisions since Roth has set the limits of, and given
substance to, the obscenity test enunciated there, although no
conviction under an anti-obscenity statute has been sustained
since that holding.7 In view of this fact, it has been suggested
that the supposed victory for public decency under Roth was
illusory.8
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of N. Y. 9 (the Lady
Chatterly's Lover film) held that a so-called "obscene idea"--in
this case the presentation of adultery as desirable-may not
constitutionally be proscribed. Bmith v. California'0 held that a
statute making criminal the publication, distribution, etc., of
obscene materials must depend upon the element of scienter to
be constitutionally viable. Manual Enterprises v. Day,"- a case
in which deviate publications had been denied distribution
through the mails, added a gloss to the Roth "prurient interest"
standard by ruling that the material in question must also be
''patently offensive" as well.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago'2 held that a statute
calling for prior restraint by a censorship board is not invalid
per se. A related case, Bantam Books v. Sullivan,'3 held that the
activities of the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Moral-
ity in Youth were unconstitutional as a prior administrative re-
straint on free speech under color of law.
The per curiam reversal citing Roth has also been employed
to upset lower convictions.'
4
Two state procedural schemes for the suppression of obscenity
have been overturned since Roth. Marcus v. Search Warrants'5
invalidated a Missouri ex parte search and seizure procedure.
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas'6 held that a similar procedure
was constitutionally deficient in not allowing an adversary hear-
ing before seizure.
7. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
8. Mulroy, Obscenity, Pornography, and Censorship, 49 A.B.A.J. 869 (1963).
9. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
10. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
11. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
12. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
13. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
14. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958); One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (1958).
15. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
16. 84 Sup. Ct. 1686 (1964).
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In Jacobellis the Court explored the question of the nature of
community standards under the Roth test and the function of
the final appellate body in applying them.1" Jacobellis had been
convicted under the Ohio anti-obscenity statute which provides
in part that "no person shall knowingly . . . exhibit . . . an
obscene, lewd, or lascivious . . . motion picture film .... ,,18
The film involved was a French import, Les Amants (The Lov-
ers). 19 In his initial appeal in which Jacobellis contested the
conviction as a violation of the right of free speech, a three-
judge panel affirmed.20 Although it does not appear whether
the film was exhibited at the trial level, where a jury was waived,
or whether the question of obscenity was put in issue, the second
appellate body, which affirmed, 2 . did view the work. The opin-
ion, echoing Mr. Justice Frankfurter, described the film as
".. . not hard core pornography, i.e., filth for filth's sake. It
was worse. It was filth for money's sake.122 Both courts of ap-
peal quoted Roth and held it applicable to the motion picture
which Jacobellis had exhibited.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the conviction
was reversed as a violation of first and fourteenth amendment
rights under Roth. Mir. Justice Brennan speaking for the ma-
jority held that "community standards" means national com-
munity standards and that therefore the question of whether any
given work of expression is obscene to the extent that it may
be suppressed by state law rests with the Supreme Court of the
nation. The problem therefore becomes one of "constitutional
fact" upon inspection of the work, a judicial reading in which
the pronouncement of "contemporary community standards" is
tested against the constitutional norm.
The reasoning adopted in Jacobellis was earlier expressed in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kingsley where
he advocated a case-by-case constitutional appraisal-a line of
17. For a discussion of general case law definition of "community standards,"
see Note, Obscenity-What Is The Test? 5 ARiz. L. Rxv. 265 (1961).
18. OHio REv. CODE § 2905.34 (1953).
19. Although the Court had once held that expression by means of motion
pictures was not included in the protection of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments' guarantees of freedom of speech and press, Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), the decision was reversed six years
prior to the Roth case in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
In this connection see generally Haimbaugh, Film Censorship Since Roth-
Alberts, 51 Ky. L.J. 656 (1962).
20. 115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N.R.2d 123 (1961).
21. 173 Ohio St. 22, 18 Ohio Op.2d 207, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
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thought which Mr. Justice Black refused to follow in his Kings-
ley dissent.
23
A sufficiency of evidence rule advocated in the dissenting
opinion of the Chief Justice under which the Court would con-
sider the limited question of the availability of evidence to sup-
port a lower finding of obscenity under proper instructions was
rejected as a shirking of constitutional duty.
The illusive concept of "community standards" is thus to be
given final embodiment in the reactions to a given work by the
members of the Court. Although inviting the epithet of "super
censor and overseer of private morals" in taking to itself the role
of arbiter, the Court, after declaring that obscenity is not con-
stitutionally protected in Roth, must of necessity define further,
as the cases arise, what falls within the area of protection.
How would such a test operate in practice? The Court in Roth
quoted approvingly the charge to the fact finder in the lower
proceedings.
You judge the circulars, pictures and publications which
have been put in evidence by present-day standards of the
community. You may ask yourselves does it offend the com-
mon conscience of the community by present-day standards.
In this case . . . you and you alone are the exclusive
judges of what the common conscience of the community is.24
Clearly here the meaning of "community standards" is the fact
finder's actual judgment of the allegedly obscene material. A
different instruction is hardly conceivable since a jury could not
be told or expected to apply a "national standard" even if it were
assumed that such a norm exists.
Although the Roth holding in the light of the Jacobellis case
appears to invoke an actual national consensus on obscene ex-
pression, obviously there is in fact no such general agreement.
It is submitted that the theoretical concept of "community
standards" represents a constitutional compromise between two
basic rights-trial by jury and freedom of expression-which
tend to conflict under a typical fact situation. At one extreme
is the intolerable effect of having a jury determine whether a
23. 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959): "If despite the Constitution, however, this
nation is to embark on a dangerous road of censorship, my belief is that this
court is about the most inappropriate supreme board of censors that could be
found. So far as I know, judges possess no special expertise providing excep-
tional competency to set standards and supervise the private morals of the
nation."
24. 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
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given -work of expression may be published -while, at the other,
lies the possibility of denying a citizen the right of trial by his
peers where he may be criminally convicted. Under the Jaco-
bellis resolution the initial fact finder still judges whether the
accused did in fact possess certain materials with the intent of
publishing them, etc. The issue of obscenity, although in issue
and obstensibly resolvable, is subject to de novo consideration by
the high court.
A sufficiency of evidence rule, -which at first blush recom-
mends itself as not involving the high court in independent
judgments on the question of obscenity, does not upon analysis
relieve the tribunal of any appreciable burden and indeed would
complicate the judicial process. Presumably such a rule would
operate in the area of obscenity as in other appellate inquiries:
under the evidence presented could reasonable men have found
thus-and-so. What then does a reasonable man consider to be
obscene? And if this question be answered satisfactorily, the
fundamental problem of sustaining the constitutional guaran-
tees-if necessary in spite of what reasonable jurors may think-
yet remains.
As a practical matter, it would appear that the post-Roth
Court is applying a so-called "hard-core pornography" 25 test in
reversing lower obscenity convictions.2 What the substance of
this standard is can only be negatively inferred at most.
In view of the recent liberal policy of the Court, it has been
suggested that the control of obscenity, if desirable, should be
left to interested individuals and private groups on a voluntary
basis. 27 Also, it is submitted that a carefully drawn statute di-
25. The so-called "hard core pornography" test was followed in Excellent
Publications v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962); the test was not
followed in Kahn v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1962) and Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Hendricks, 262 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1958).
26. See concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in the instant case, 84 Sup. Ct.
1683 (1964).
27. Levy, A Position on the Control of Obscenity, 51 Ky. L. J. 651 (1963):
... Private individuals and groups, free from the constitutional restrictions
which narrowly confine the efforts of their governments to control obscene
publications may lawfully pursue their own extra-legal efforts to do so, so long
as they remain themselves within the law in those efforts; and, under existing
law, a broad range of permissible activity is open to them." Cf. Bantam Books
v. Sullivan, 370 U.S. 478 (1963), holding that the activities of the Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth were unconstitutional as a prior
administrative restraint on free speech under the coercive color of law. The
state commission was organized to educate the public on obscene publications,
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rected at the distribution of obscene materials to minors would
be held constitutional.
28
The South Carolina anti-obscenity statute, Section 16-414 of
the 1962 Code, does not in terms reach the display of obscene mo-
tion pictures.29 The language of the act, which is generally
directed at the suppression of printed matter, has not been con-
strued in this state.30 Section 16-415 proscribes the exhibition of
indecent pictures, show bills, etc., although silent on the actual
performance.
Butler v. Michigan,31 a pre-Roth decision which involved the
obscenity standard, held a statute quite similar to Section 16-414
unconstitutional. The identical language of the Michigan stat-
ute,32 "manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth," had been relied on in the conviction of an accused who
sold obscene matter to a member of the general public. Reversing
the conviction, the Court held that the statutory standard was
not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it was said to
deal. The standard must be applied to the average adult person
rather than to the most susceptible person.
Sections 16-416 through 16-420,33 provisions applicable only
to Richland County, prescribe an injunctive procedure for the
suppression of obscene materials which is more typical of the
modern state statute. The standard of obscene expression is not
whether it may have a corrupting influence on minors as is the
case with the state-wide provision. To this extent the provisions
28. See 84 Sup. Ct. 1676, 1682 (1964).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414 (1962). Penalty for publishing, etc., obscene
books, papers, etc.-Whoever knowingly imports, prints, publishes, sells or dis-
tributes any book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing containing any
obscene, indecent or improper print, picture, figure or description manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth or introduces into a family,
school or place of education or brings, procures, receives or has in his posses-
sion any such book, pamphlet, printed paper, picture, or ballad or other thing,
either for the purpose of sale or exhibition or to aid in a circulation or with
intent to introduce the same into a family, school or place of education, shall be
punished by imprisonment not exceeding two years or by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars, or both, at the discretion of the court. (Note that the lan-
guage satisfies the scienter requirement on which Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959), failed, discussed infra.).
30. The statute was applied in State v. Simring, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E.2d 9
(1956) (appealed on an unrelated point).
31. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
32. MICH. PENAL CODE § 343.
33. S.C. CODW ANN. § 16-416 (1962). Actions to enjoin possession, sale or
distribution of obscene matter in Richland County-The chief of police of
any municipality in the county or the sheriff of Richland County, when any
person sells or distributes or is about to sell or distribute or has in his posses-
sion with the intent to sell or distribute or is about to acquire possession with
[Vol. 16
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satisfy the test of Butler v. Michigan.3 4 Section 16-418, provid-
ing for speedy hearing on the issue of obscenity, appears to be
acceptable from the standpoint of A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas,35 the case requiring an adversary hearing in obscenity
suppression.
A recent West Virginia decision, State v. Miller,30 held that
a conviction under the obscenity statute of the state which is in
part identical to Section 16-414 was unconstitutional under But-
ler v. Michigan. In the light of the constitutional status of stat-
utes which are directed towards corruption of the morals of
youth but which are invoked to make criminal the sale of obscene
materials to the general public, it is submitted that Section 16-
414 be redrawn in two distinct branches to achieve its apparent
objects. One such branch should make criminal the sale to minors
of materials which "manifestly tend to the corruption of the
morals of youth." The section as now written bears such a con-
struction. And to the extent that the same section is intended
to forbid the sale of obscene matter to the general public, a
branch should be added which is not limited by the "corruption
of minors" standard.
PAUL R. Hmi3AD
intent to sell or distribute any book, magazine, paper, picture, drawing, photo-
graph, figure, image or any written or printed matter of an indecent character,
which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or which contains an
article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purpose, may by his own
act or on relation of any citizen maintain an action for an injunction against
such person in the circuit court or county court to prevent the sale or further
sale or the distribution or further distribution or the acquisition or possession
of any book, story paper, writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, figure
or image or any written or printed matter of an indecent character, herein
described. (§ 16-417 charges the defendant with knowledge of the contents of
obscene matter sold after service of process; § 16-418 provides for prompt trial
[discussed infra]; § 16-419 provides that obscene materials must be destroyed
after adverse judgment.).
34. Supra note 31.
35. Supra note 16.
36. 145 W.Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472 (1960) (citing and applying the Roth and
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"The operations of an establishment affect commerce within
the meaning of this title if ... it serves or offers to serve inter-
state travellers or a substantial portion of the food which it
serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in
interstate commerce. .. ."
By these words, Congress has attempted, under the power
granted to it by the commerce clause, to exert control over dis-
criminatory practices regarding race throughout the United
States, and in so attempting has caused violent reaction in many
areas.
This article is devoted solely to a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, specifically,
section 201-C from which the above quotation was taken. No
attempt will be made here to discuss the entire act, or even the
entire title, but study will be confined to the method used by
Congress in its attempt to gain control and the validity of the
"test" laid down by the act.
At this point, a summary of the argument against the con-
stitutionality of Title II seems in order.
If an act allows regulation of an activity over which Congress
has not been granted power by the Constitution, the act is uncon-
stitutional. Congress admittedly has the power to control some
purely intrastate activities due to their effect on interstate com-
merce, but they are limited to those activities which would tend
to burden and obstruct commerce if left uncontrolled by Con-
gress.2 In order to prevent Congress from regulating that which
it is not constitutionally empowered to regulate, it must be deter-
mined which local activities affect commerce so as to warrant
congressional regulation.
Prior to the Civil Rights Act, Congress had used two basic
methods to determine which local activities it might regulate
under power granted it by the commerce clause. The Civil Rights
Act is based on neither of these nor does it provide for a new
method.
As the test used by the act brings virtually all local activity
of the type covered within the scope of the act, and as all local
activity does not affect commerce within the meaning of the
1. Civil Rights Act, Section 201 (c), 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (1964).
2. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1964).
32
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commerce clause, the Civil Rights Act necessarily allows con-
gressional control over some local activities which do not affect
commerce and which are beyond the power of Congress to con-
trol, and is thus unconstitutional.
What Must Be Present Before Congress Can Regulate
A Local Activity?
For Congress to regulate intrastate activity, it must be shown
that there is a close and substantial relationship between the
activity sought to be regulated and interstate commerce.
3
There can be no question that Congress has the power to regu-
late local and intrastate activities that are not themselves a part
of, but which are reasonably related to, interstate commerce.
While such power is not expressly granted Congress by the Con-
stitution, it has been recognized as being reasonably implied
since at least Gibbons v. Ogden.'
The pertinent question then, is not whether such a power over
local activities exists, but whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964
has been enacted within proper limits.
In United States 'v. Darby, the Supreme Court stated:
The Power of Congress over interstate commerce is not con-
fined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect inter-
state commerce, or the exercise of the power of Congress
over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Thus, the Court recognized that the power under the commerce
clause extends to those intrastate activities which are sufficiently
related to interstate commerce to justify their regulation. But the
Court has also recognized that where purely local and intrastate
activities are involved, there must be a suitable regard for the
principle that in such cases, the justification for regulation must
appear.6
3. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
5. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1940).
6. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1943); Palmer v. Massachusetts,
308 U.S. 685 (1939) ; Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1930) ; Houston
E.W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1913); Polish Nat'l Alliance v.
NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1943) (concurring opinion).
33
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The principle that the regulation of a purely local activity
requires a clear showing that such a regulation is appropriate to
carrying out the primary power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce is deeply imbedded in the law; and represents
nothing more than a recognition that, since all federal power
must be derived from the Constitution, matters which are not
within an express grant of congressional power cannot be
touched by federal hands unless it is first shown that the regula-
tion is necessary and proper in the exercise of an expressly given
power, Thus, where the commerce clause is relied upon, it must
be established that there is a close and substantial relationship
between the local activity sought to be controlled and interstate
commerce?
It has been said that the effect on commerce of the activity
sought to be controlled must be "direct" as opposed to "indirect."
This was aptly, if obliquely, stated by Justice Cardozo concur-
ring in the Schechter case,8 where he said:
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the dis-
tinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communi-
cated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments
at the center. A society such as ours is an elastic medium
which transmits all tremors throughout its territory; the
only question is of their size. The law is not indifferent to
considerations of degree. Activities local in nature do not
become national because of distant repercussions.
The question is one of degree, and the necessary "degree" has
been variously defined as "close and substantial,"0 that which
"burdens and obstructs commerce if left uncontrolled," 10 and that
which is "appropriate" for congressional regulation. 1
The concept of "cause and effect" is necessarily involved. For
Congress to regulate a local activity a causal relationship be-
tween the operation of the activity sought to be controlled and
an effect, substantial in degree, on interstate commerce must be
shown.
Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress has relied on two
basic methods of "showing" this cause and effect relationship
before attempting to regulate a local activity.
7. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
8. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1934).
9. Wickard v. Filburn, Sitpra note 7.
10. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, Supra note 2.
11. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1940).
[Vol. 16
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One is illustrated by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938,12 which was held constitutional in Wickard v. Filburn"';
the other by the National Labor Relations Act 14 which was held
constitutional by NA RB v. Jones & Laughlin.r5
The Agricultural Adjustment Act, which provided for control
of farm commodities, was based on eight legislative findingsl
that the commodity sought to be controlled would tend to burden
or obstruct commerce if left uncontrolled by Congress. The
Wicekard decision was based on the specific finding that pro-
ducer-consumed wheat would tend to obstruct the control of
interstate commerce by Congress if allowed to go unregulated . 7
Three things should be carefully noted. First, a hearing was held
on the specific question of the effect of wheat on interstate com-
merce. Second, the facts were found to show that there was a
substantial effect on that commerce. Third, that Congress was
allowed to regulate the production of the commodity only under
these circumstances.
In contrast to the finding by Congress of the necessary rela-
tionship of the local activity to interstate commerce, the National
Labor Relations Act contained a provision for a case by case
determination of whether the particular labor dispute sought to
be controlled so affected interstate commerce as to warrant con-
gressional regulation."' It may be reasonably inferred that the
act was held constitutional only because it made provision to
determine what labor disputes affected commerce before it al-
lowed congressional control,19 and it is of more than passing
significance that the Supreme Court has said the National Labor
12. 52 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1938).
13. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
14. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
15. 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
16. 52 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C. (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
17. 52 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C. § 1281, § 1331, Part III-Marketing Quotas-
Wheat-Legislative Finding of Effect on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and
Necessity of Regulation.
18. National Labor Relations Act, Section 9 (c), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1935) : "[The Board shall] investigate such petitions and if it has rea-
sonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce
exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing
may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall
not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon
the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." (Em-
phasis added).
19. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1936): "This
definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion. The grant of authority to the
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Relations Act represents "the full sweep of congressional power
under the commerce clause.1
20
Thus, if the act represents the full extent of congressional
power under the commerce clause, and it was held constitu-
tional only because it made provision for a determination of
which labor disputes did, in fact, affect interstate commerce be-
fore allowing congressional regulation; it necessarily follows
that an act which attempts to exercise congressional control as
broadly as the National Labor Relations Act, but which does not
provide for a method of determining which local activities do
affect commerce, must be declared unconstitutional.
By What Method Does Title II Determine
Which Local Activities Affect Commerce?
The Civil Rights Act of 196d: incorporates neither of the two
basic methods for determining which local activity can be regu-
lated by Congress.
Merely reading Title II of the Civil Rights Act discloses that
there can be no analogy drawn between it and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. There is no mention of the cumulative effect of
local activities on interstate commerce, but specific reference to
only individual establishments. Moreover, there was no specific
legislative finding similar to those made by Congress prior to
the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
The testimony taken by the Senate Judiciary Committee21 and
the Senate Commerce Committee22 dealt mainly with the effect
the 1963 race riots had on business in the various cities and with
the difficulty the Negro encountered in travelling. There was no
testimony as to the effect a local establishment would have on
interstate conunerce due to that local establishment's selling
goods which had previously moved in interstate commerce. As
employees and employers. Its terms do not impose upon all industry regardless
of effects upon interstate or foreign commerce. It purports to reach only what
may be deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce, and thus qualified, it must
be construed as contemplating the exercise of control within constitutional
bounds. . . .Whether or not a particular action does affect commerce in such
a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to
lie within the authority conferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to be
determined as individual cases arise." (Emphasis added).
20. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1943); NLRB v. Fain-
blatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1938).
21. Hearings on S. 1731 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
22. Hearings on S. 1732 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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congressional control must be based on a showing that the ac-
tivity sought to be regulated affects commerce, this omission is
fatal. The mere use of the words "affect commerce 2 3 does not,
and cannot, constitute such a showing.
Likewise, the Civil Rights Act contains no language com-
parable to the language in the National Labor Relations Act2"
which provided for a case by case determination of the question
whether a local labor dispute affected commerce sufficiently to
allow congressional regulation. Thus, it cannot be said that Title
II of the Civil Rights Act allows congressional control over only
those local activities which are found to relate to interstate com-
merce. In fact, the act allows congressional control over all local
activity whether or not that activity affects commerce within
the meaning of the commerce clause.
2 5
The Act Merely Engages In A Conclusive Presumption
On examination, the language used in Title II demonstrates
the following "reasoning." First, the act declares that all per-
sons are entitled to the enjoyment of the facilities at places of
public accommodations. 26 Second, the act lists the establish-
ments which, if they "affect commerce," are places of public
accommodation. 27 Third, the establishments are said to "affect
commerce if they serve or offer to serve interstate travellers or
if a substantial portion of the food which they serve, or gasoline,
or other product which it sells, has moved in commerce.1
28
Although the magic words "affect commerce" are used, they
are rendered meaningless by the imposition of a conclusive and
inflexible presumption that commerce is affected if one of the
two facts are met. To illustrate just how meaningless the words
"affect commerce" become, it seems fit to paraphrase the lan-
guage of Title II: "... no establishment covered by the Act
23. Civil Rights Act, Section 201 (c) 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (1964).
24. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
25. i.e., Stands in such close and substantial relationship to commerce that it
would tend to burden or obstruct that commerce if left uncontrolled by
Congress.
26. Civil Rights Act, Section 201 (a), 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (1964):
"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, . . .of any place of public accommodation ...without discrimina-
tion of the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
27. Civil Rights Act, Section 201 (b), 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (1964):
"Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect
commerce. .. "
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may refuse service to any person because of his race, color, re-
ligion or national origin, either if it serves or offers to serve
interstate travellers or a substantial portion of the food which
it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved
in interstate commerce."2 9 The words, "affect commerce" are
effectively erased.
The test imposed by Congress makes the act virtually all in-
clusive, and unless the operations of every single establishment
covered actually affects commerce within the meaning of the
commerce clause, Congress, in effect, has legislated a presump-
tion in which there may be no connection between the fact as-
sumed and the fact capable of proof. The presumption engaged
in is absolute and conclusive, and totally forecloses factual in-
quiry as to whether the activity sought to be regulated does or
does not affect commerce.
Unless the conclusive presumption thus legislated is valid as
applied to every establishment covered by the act, Congress has
regulated activity over which it has no authority and the statute
cannot meet the constitutional test.
The Tests Used By Congress Are PatentZy Invalid
In the Melung case, which held Title II of the Civil Rights
Act unconstitutional, the Court indicated the "test" was invalid
after noting that no case had been called to its attention and that
it had found none which "held that the National Government
has the power to control the conduct of people on the local level
because they may happen to trade sporadically with persons who
may be travelling in interstate commerce. 530 The position thus
taken is supported by the weight of considerable authority.31
In Boynton v. Virginia,3 2 the Supreme Court stated:
We are not holding that every time a bus stops at a wholly
independent roadside restaurant the Interstate Commerce
Act requires that restaurant service be supplied in harmony
with the provisions of that Act. We decide only the case,
only its facts, where circumstances show that the terminal
29. Katzenbach v. McClung, Civil action No. 64-468, United States District
Court (N.D. Ala., Sept. 17, 1964).
30. Ibid.
31. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1943); Elizabeth Hosp.
v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959); Williams v. Howard Johnson's
Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959) (dicta).
32. 364 U.S. 454, 463 (1960).
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and restaurant operate as an integral part of the bus car-
riers transportation service for interstate travellers.
A major difficulty with the test applied by the Civil Rights
Act lies in the language used by Congress. It is impossible to
determine to which activities the act applies. Since "serves" and
"€offers to serve" are stated in the disjunctive, one must neces-
sarily assume that a restaurant which has never served, and pros-
pectively would never expect to serve, an interstate traveller
would be covered by the act if it merely "offered" to do so. This
necessarily applies to a restaurant located far from the paths of
interstate traffic if, in making a general offer to serve the public,
it was willing to serve an interstate traveller if one should ap-
pear. The term "interstate traveller" further confuses the issue
as it is not defined by the act. It could refer to one which is in
the immediate process of travelling from one state to another
and who, after eating, immediately resumes his journey, or per-
haps one who is visiting for a time in a strange state and during
his stay, visits a local restaurant.
Regardless of how the term is construed, it is obvious that
Congress has attempted to exercise control over establishments
which do not affect commerce within the meaning of the com-
merce clause, and thus the act is beyond the legislative power
of Congress.
With regard to the "substantial amount of food" test, the
writer has been unable to locate in the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act any place where Congress considered the ques-
tion of the effect on commerce of the racial discrimination of
an establishment serving or selling goods which have moved in
interstate commerce. Aside from that lack of information, how-
ever, it is clear that the mere fact that an establishment serves
or sells goods which have moved interstate would not, in every
case, justify the conclusion that its racial policy would have an
effect on interstate commerce.
Those who drafted the Civil Rights Act seemed to have been
impressed by the fact that in some cases the National Labor
Relations Act has based its jurisdiction upon evidence that goods
sold or consumed reach the employer from some point out of
state. In such cases, the Board, admonished by Congress to find
that the specific activity affects commerce, has determined in
effect that since the employer has in the past purchased out of
state goods, it may be reasonably inferred that he will continue
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would have an effect on commerce. This effect on commerce
must be found to be substantial before the Board can exercise
its authority.3 3 Further, all cases so decided under the National
Labor Relations Act support the rather obvious observation that
it is future, not past, interstate commerce with which Congress
may be concerned. However, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the presumption deals only with goods that have moved in inter-
state commerce. Thus, a particular activity may fall squarely
within the purview of the act, when, in fact, its current activi-
ties do not affect commerce at all.
The point is, of course, that relating coverage to cases where
goods have moved in commerce by a conclusive presumption such
as this, ignores the fact that in every case the establishment may
not have further substantial connection with out of state goods.
Of course, in the majority of cases, it will, but if the presumption
is incorrect in one case, Congress has attempted to exercise con-
trol over a local activity which does not directly affect interstate
commerce, and this it cannot do.
It must be recalled that in determining whether a particular
labor dispute affects commerce, the National Labor Relations
Board operates, by statute,34 under an elaborate administrative
procedure. For example, testimony at the hearing35 must be re-
duced to writing and the Board is required to make a finding
based on the preponderance of the evidence. In the event of a
review by a court of appeals, the Board's findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by "substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole." 36 Among the facts so determined by the
Board are those relating to its own jurisdiction, i.e., that the
dispute sought to be controlled does affect interstate commerce.
If, therefore, the Board's findings are rejected by the appellate
court, it must be on the grounds that the findings were not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. If, for example, the Board finds
that the unfair labor practice involved affects commerce and
the court of appeals refuses to enforce the Board's order on
jurisdictional grounds, the Court looks only to see if there is
substantial evidence to support the Board's jurisdictional find-
ings. If so, the Board's determination must be upheld.
33. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
34. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
35. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
36, National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
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In a typical case, NLRB v. Reliance FueZ OiZ Corp.81 this is
exactly what happened. The evidence showed that Reliance's
operation was local; that it bought fuel oil from Gulf, which
Reliance in turn sold locally to its customers; that Gulf was in
interstate commerce and that the oil sold to Reliance was deliv-
ered to Gulf from outside the state. The trial examiner found
an effect on interstate commerce. The Board adopted his find-
ings. The court of appeals denied enforcement on the grounds
that the record did not tell it enough about the volume of oil in
the relevant market. The case was remanded for more evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record showed
substantial evidence to support the Board's findings.
Notwithstanding the superficial attempt to base the Civil
Rights Act on the foundation of the National Labor Relations
Act, the Civil Rights Act is a radical departure from the ra-
tionale of the Labor Board cases. Merely because the Labor
Board has been upheld in a particular case in finding a substan-
tial effect on commerce where goods have moved across state
line before reaching an employer, does not mean that there will
be the same effect in every case. The Board would also be upheld
if, according to the evidence, it found that no effect on com-
merce existed.
The ultimate fact to be determined is the existence of an effect
on commerce caused by the local activity sought to be regulated,
and the Civil Rights Act has made no provision for making this
determination. Title II relies upon a conclusive presumption that
the effect is present in all cases where a substantial portion of
the goods sold have moved in interstate commerce. This tech-
nique may be novel, but it is fatal where the ultimate fact pre-
sumed is not so in fact, and the presumed fact is necessary and
indispensable to the constitutionality of the attempted exercise
of congressional power.
On the strength of the reasoning outlined above, i.e., that there
cannot be congressional control over a local activity absent a
showing that the activity affects commerce and that there has
been no such finding made which would support the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, it is my opinion that the act is unconstitutional
as written, in that it allows control where authority to control
is lacking. Further, the method by which this control was ob-
tained (by conclusive presumption) opens the door for further
increase in government regulation of an individual's public and
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private life. For those who say that such inroads have not yet
been attempted, it seems fit to point out the words of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette38 : "Our Constitution was designed to
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings." I submit that the
beginning has not been avoided.
RoBERT W. DaBL, J.
38. 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
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NON-VOTING SHARES-THE CODE AND
THE CONSTITUTION
The status of non-voting shares in South Carolina is highly
uncertain. It is not an alarming uncertainty, perhaps, but at
least a quiet anxiety with alarming possibilities, ready and wait-
ing for the first disgruntled, disfranchised shareholder to put
the courts to task. The dilemma stems from an 1895 constitu-
tional provision and its effect on a considerably refined cor-
porate milieu.
Article IX, section 11 of the Constitution of South Carolina
states:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the election
of directors, trustees or managers of all corporations so that
each stockholder shall be allowed to cast, in person or by
proxy, as many votes as the number of shares he owns multi-
plied by the number of directors, trustees or managers to
be elected, the same to be cast for any one candidate or to
be distributed among two or more candidates.
This provision closely follows article XI, section 3 of the Illi-
nois Constitution of 18701 which has been used as a guide in
several other states.2 Primarily, the purpose of the provision is
to insure proportional minority representation by conferring
the right and power of cumulative voting on shareholders. The
provision has received much attention and celebrated litigation3
arising from maneuvers attempting to restrict or limit that man-
date. The constitutionality of this area is unresolved in South
Carolina, but there is posed a fundamental question even more
fraught with the possibility of sudden upheaval of corporate
control: Does article IX, section II, by its language, "[E]ach
stockholder shall be allowed to cast . . . as many votes as the
number of shares he owns. .. .", proscribe withholding the vote
from shares of any class or preference?
1. "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for
directors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have
the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock
owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be
elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as
the number of shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the same
principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors
or managers shall not be elected in any other manner."
2. For a concise summary of the origin and devolution of the provision see
Pittman, Nonvoting Shares in Missouri, 26 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1961).
3. E.g., Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955); People ex
rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958).
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The policy of the legislature4 was made abundantly clear by
the enactment of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act of
1962. The act expressly allows the articles of incorporation to
"grant, limit or deny the voting rights of the shares of any class
to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of chapters 1.1
to 1.4 of this Title" 5-to "either absolutely or conditionally, deny,
limit, or otherwise define the voting powers of any designated
preferred or special class or classes of shares."6 Furthermore, the
act repeatedly refers to shares entitled to vote to elect directors.
7
This apparent conflict can be received with rather sophisticated
apathy, but a look beyond our borders indicates that a certain
amount of wariness is well founded.
The non-voting issue has come up directly in other states that
inherited essentially this same constitutional language. In 1905
the cumulative voting provision of the Missouri Constitution s
was challenged in State em reZ. Frank v. Swanger.9 A non-voting
preferred issue was allowed despite the apparent proscription of
the constitution by avoiding a literal construction and ascribing
to the provision only the single purpose of the guaranty of cumu-
lative voting, and finding that "each shareholder" meant "each
shareholder entitled to vote."
We hold, then, that the evident purpose of section 6, article
12, of our Constitution was the guaranty to stockholders
having the right to vote of cumulating their votes, and has
no reference to the contractual rights of the stockholders
inter sese of providing that preferred stockholders shall or
shall not have the right to vote such stock, and to hold that
it has taken away this well-recognized common-law right
would be to distort its obvious purpose.' 0
That the decision in Swanger did not rest on those contractual
rights-a preference in dividends in consideration of relinquish-
4. For insight as to the feelings and assumptions with which the practice is
carried on see articles in the Synposiun Of South Carolina Corporation Law,
15 S.C.L.REv.; Nexsen, Classes And Issues Of Shares at 359; Moore, Share-
holders at 387; Freeman, Directors And Officers at 401; Folk, The South
Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations And Prospects at 483. See also
Sperry, The Power Of A West Virginia Corporation To Deprive Classes Of
Its Stock Of The Right To Vote For The Election Of Directors Or Managers,
40 W. VA. L. Q. 97 (1933).
5. S. C. CoDn ANN. § 12-15.1(a) (Supp. 1963).
6. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.11(b) (Supp. 1963).
7. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.1, 12-16.10 (Supp. 1963).
8. Mo. CONST. art. XII, § 6 (1875).
9. 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872, 2 L.R.A. (n.s.) 121 (1905).
10. Id., 89 S.W. at 877.
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ing the vote-was made explicit in 1963 in Shapiro v. Tropicana
Lanes, Inc."- There the holders of Class A non-voting common
shares attempted to vote in a directors election. The court af-
firmed a declaratory judgment that such a class was neither
violative of the constitution nor of the policy of the state. Both
parties relied on Swanger. The Class A shareholders contended
that Swanger was based on mutuality-that the right of pre-
ferred shareholders to receive dividends even if the common
shareholders did not was good reason for the denial of voting
rights. The court disagreed:
The Constitution says 'each shareholder' shall have the
right to vote. Certainly, preferred shareholders are included
in that provision. So, if the constitutional provision was
intended to guarantee 'each shareholder' a right to vote,
then the holding in State eco rel. Frank v. Swanger, supra,
is not sound.12
The soundness of Swanger was fortified by the fact that the
decision had stood unchallenged for forty years when the con-
stitution of 194513 was adopted with a similar provision in it.
Distinguishing common and preferred shares proves to be a
needless exercise when a single purpose construction is taken.
The mutuality argument gives no help to the non-voting share-
holder where the non-voting common may receive even more
consideration than a preference through a higher degree of par-
ticipation.
In People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson14 the
TUinois court required a literal construction of the Illinois Con-
stitution in refusing mandamus to compel issuance of a certifi-
cate authorizing an issue of preferred non-voting shares. There
was no conflict between the Illinois enabling legislation and the
constitutional provision: they read essentially the same as to
voting for directors. An attempt was made to show that the single
purpose of the provision was to confer only the right of cumu-
lative voting by arguing that the use of "or" between the clauses
of the provision should be understood to give only the alterna-
tives of straight or cumulative voting. The court rejected that
argument. Acts authorizing the incorporation of companies prior
to the introduction of the cumulative voting provision into the
11. 371 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1963).
12. Id., 371 S.W.2d at 240.
13. Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1945).
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constitution were recited as fixing the right of one share to one
vote, and by the embodiment of that principle into the constitu-
tion, along with cumulative voting, the court reasoned that the
multiplicity of the provision was established-each share may
vote, and may cumulate. State ex rel. Frank 'v. Swanger was
lightly treated, distinguished weakly by "quite markedly differ-
ent wording" 5 of the respective constitutions, and held of no
great weight. The court turned to the Delaware case of Brooks V.
State0 where a similar constitutional provision invalidated stat-
utory authorization to allow a corporation to give a shareholder
a voting power different from that conferred by the constitution.
Debates in the constitutional convention were given no signifi-
cance: "[W]here the language is clear and unambiguous, the
debates can have little or no bearing or effect in their construe-
tion."'1 The court reasoned that if the convention intended:
[T]hat only those stockholders who were given the right to
vote by charter or articles of incorporation adopted by the
company were included, it would have been perfectly easy
to word this section as to convey this meaning, but instead
of so wording it the convention used the language, 'every
stockholder shall have the right to vote ... .118
We have in Illinois a rejection of any other than a strict inter-
pretation-a policy determination to preserve the right of con-
trol and management in shareholders. The virility of this inter-
pretation was affirmed obiter in Wolfson v. Avery. 9 In Missouri
the existence of non-voting shares was reconciled by a liberal
construction, reflecting the desire of the courts, the legislature,
and practitioners to let shareholders make their own bargains.
However, it is in the West Virginia situation of 1956 that we
find the closest parallel to that in South Carolina. The familiar
constitutional provision, 20 if its words are to be understood in
their natural and ordinary meaning as in Illinois, is clearly in
conflict with the policy of the legislature, as expressed in the
15. The difference in wording does not appear significant except that the vote
fixing clause is separated from the cumulative voting clause by the conjunction
"and" in the Missouri version and by "or" in the Illinois version. The court
found this to be of no significance. See 134 N.E. at 710. See also Pittman,
note 2 supra, at 121.
16. 3 Boyce (Del.) 1, 79 AtI. 790, 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1126 (1914). The con-
stitutional prohibition was removed here prior to the decision of the case.
17. 302 I1. 300, 134 N.E. 707, 711 (1922).
18. Id., 134 N.E. at 709.
19. 126 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. 1955) (dictum).
20. W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1872).
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code, and with the practice of issuing certificates of incorpora-
tion with non-voting shares.
21
In State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien2 a
proposed issue of non-voting common was not allowed and the
statutes expressly authorizing such issue were held violative of
the constitution insofar as they limited the right of shareholders
to vote. This West Virginia constitution had been in effect since
1872, and the legislature had adhered to the direction of the
constitution that each shareholder have the right to vote until
1901 when the words "and with or without the right to vote"2
first appeared. The code as it stood in 1956 was specific in
empowering corporations to "issue one or more classes of stock
or one or more series of stock within any class thereof...
with such voting powers, full or limited, or without voting
power .... -24 It further provided that "in elections of directors
of corporations each stockholder shall have the right to cast one
vote for each share of stock owned by him and entitled to
vote...." 25 One hundred and twenty charters had been issued
with structures including limited voting rights since 1948 and
prior to that date several hundred other corporations had been
authorized by the state to issue such stock.
2 6
Argument was made that the provision was ambiguous and
that any doubt as to the validity of the pertinent statutes should
be resolved in favor of the construction adopted by the legisla-
ture and followed by the actual practice of many years.
The court dispensed with Swanger as relying on an inapposite
case, 27 but was favorably persuaded by the reasoning of Brooks
v. State28 and People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Em-
merson.
2 9
Before proceeding to the denouement, the similarity of West
Virginia legislative history to that of South Carolina should be
noted:
21. See 59 W. VA. L. REv. 374 (1957).
22. 142 W. Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171 (1956).
23. W. VA. AcTs. 1901, c. 35, § 5.
24. W. VA. CcDE ch. 31, art. 1, §22 (1955).
25. W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 66 (1955).
26. 142 W.Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171, 181 (1956).
27. For a thorough criticism of the Swanger decision see Pittman, supra
note 2, at 144.
28. 3 Boyce (Del.) 1, 79 At]. 790 (1914).
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This Court is not unmindful of the weight that must be
given to the construction of a constitutional provision by
the Legislature, and by an official of the Executive branch
of the government .. .nor are we unmindful of the rule
that in construing a statute if there is any doubt as to its
constitutionality, that doubt should be resolved in favor of
its validity . .. however, great weight is given to legisla-
tive construction of a constitutional provision only when it
is contemporaneous with or follows soon after the adoption
of the constitutional provision in question.30
It was not until twenty-nine years after the adoption of the
provision that the legislature first inserted the phrase "and en-
titled to vote." The departure from the constitutional language
in South Carolina came with the Business Corporation Act of
1962.31 This legislation, coming some sixty years after the adop-
tion of the constitutional provision, could be regarded by the
judiciary of this state as did that of West Virginia:
Where the court sees, that the Legislature has plainly vio-
lated that instrument, it is the highest duty of the court,
plainly required by the written Constitution, which it is its
sworn duty to support, to pronounce such act of the Legis-
lature unconstitutional. . . . It is undoubtedly true that as
a result of the long delay in seeking an adjudication by this
Court of the issue presented in this proceeding, there are
many charters of incorporated companies in existence pro-
viding for limited or no voting privileges by some of their
shareholders. If the provisions of Article XI, Section 4, are
not now expressive of the will of the people of this State,
resort may be had to Article XIV, of the Constitution,
wherein provision is made for the repeal or amendment of
any part thereof.
32
The adjudication brought clarification but it can hardly be
imagined that this elicited any sighs of relief. Pandora's Box
had been opened. This unsatisfactory state of the law prompted
a constitutional amendment in 1958 which provided for non-vot-
ing issues but retained the guarantee of cumulative voting for
30. 142 W.Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171, 178 (1956).
31. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-253 (1962) (repealed) was the essence of the con-
stitutional provision.
32. 142 W.Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171, 179-180 (1956).
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"every stockholder holding stock having the right to vote for
directors."
33
These developments unleashed a new set of ills concerning
their application in retrospect. Questions arise such as the con-
stitutionality of depriving the vote from those shareholders hav-
ing that right bestowed on them by the court; the effect on the
obligations of existing contracts; whether there is a deprivation
of property without due process of law. These problems, while
certainly not insurmountable, are sources of needless litigation. 4
West Virginia's position, rejecting the Illinois doctrine, is a
wiser course which should be followed in South Carolina.
There seems to be wide agreement that the constitutional
provision ought either to be repealed outright thus making
cumulative voting a statutory right only, or, at the least,
reworded so that it does not prevent issuing the types of
non-voting stock ordinarily marketed in this country. 5
Repeal, amendment, or a case in the courts seem to be the alterna-
tives, of which, an amendment, carefully drawn with an eye
toward preventing the problems of retrospectivity and allowing
the vote to be fixed outside the constitution, would eliminate the
offending effect of the provision while retaining mandatory
cumulative voting. Perhaps repeal 6 would be better in the long
run, but probably more resistance would be encountered here as
the case for cumulative voting remains, and there may be some
reluctance to place this right in the hands of the legislature with-
out check. A case in the courts will, of course, be the unwitting
and inevitable result of passivity. A decision following the Mis-
souri reasoning would not be completely secure from a subse-
33. W. VA. CowsT. art. XI, § 4 (1958): "The Legislature shall provide by
law that every corporation other than a banking institution shall have power
to issue one or more classes and series within classes of stock, with or without
par value, and with full, limited, or no voting powers, and with preferences and
special rights and qualifications, and that in all elections for directors or man-
agers of incorporated companies, every stockholder holding stock having the
right to vote for directors shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy,
for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there
are directors or managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares and give
one candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the num-
ber of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to distribute them on the same prin-
ciple among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors or
managers shall not be elected in any other manner."
34. This prospect is treated in Note: 60 W. VA. L. Rav. 203 (1958).
35. Folk, Symposium Of South Carolina Corporation Law--The South Caro-
lina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations & Prospects, 15 S.C.L.Rv. 467, 483
(1963).
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quent attack on its constitutionality. A decision following the
West Virginia reasoning would likewise, presumably, force a
constitutional amendment anyway and leave an opening for crit-
icism of its retrospective application. The Reporter of the South
Carolina Corporation Law Revision Project expressed the like-
lihood of some change in the constitutional provision being put
to the voters in the 1964 elections. 37 That likelihood, unfortu-
nately, did not come to pass. The risk of facing a holding like
that of West Virginia exacts a needless toll, the sum of which is
expressed in the lamenting dissent to State ex rel. Dewey Pore-
land Cement Co. v. O'Brien:
[T]he result of a change in the long and established practice
and policy will almost certainly result in driving corpora-
tions from the State, prevent others from coming into the
State, and deprive citizens of advantages and profits to
which they would otherwise be entitled. The resulting dam-
ages to the State and its citizens will be, in quantity, vast
and incalculable, and hopelessly irreparable.38
Any inertia toward acting on an amendment is not in keeping
with the spirit of the new Business Corporation Act nor the
spirit of economic resurgence in the region.
RAI.Ba C. RoBinIsoN, JR.
37. Id. at 468.
38. 142 W.Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171, 184 (1956).
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